Analysis and design of a cooperative weapon assignment module for advanced battle manager of a ballistic missile defense system by Brown, Willie D.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-03
Analysis and design of a cooperative weapon
assignment module for advanced battle manager of
a ballistic missile defense system
Brown, Willie D.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
ANALYSIS AND DESIGN OF A COOPERATIVE WEAPON 
ASSIGNMENT MODULE FOR ADVANCED BATTLE 









 Advisor:                   Man-Tak Shing 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-
0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per 
response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering 
and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, 
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate 
for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Title (Mix case letters) 
Analysis and Design of a Cooperative Weapon Assignment 
Module for Advanced Battle Manager of a Ballistic Missile 
Defense System   
6. AUTHOR(S) Willie D. Brown 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES:  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not 
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
    The United States is in the midst of an ambitious effort to build and deploy a wide 
range of ballistic missile defense systems. These ballistic missile defense systems 
will be effective against a host of current and postulated threats from ballistic 
missiles. In this thesis study, we explore the process of enhancing the effectiveness 
of weapon assignment for a system of systems. First, analysis of information is drawn 
from current proposed system of the ABM and its construction from the ground up. This 
research analyzes two ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), Aegis and Patriot 
respectively, their attributes, and their current and future roles in a Global 
Ballistic Defense Missile System. In addition, this thesis presents a software 
architecture for the ABM weapon assignment component module with object oriented design 
feasibility with integration as the key ingredient. This research contributed to 
highlighting some shortfalls in efforts to integrate capabilities and desired 
capabilities as the missile threat evolves and presents recommendations for follow-on 
research to improve ABM’s weapon assignment capabilities. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 104 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Design,  analysis, weapon assignment, Aegis, 
Patriot, layered architecture 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND DESIGN OF A COOPERATIVE WEAPON ASSIGNMENT 
MODULE FOR ADVANCED BATTLE MANAGER OF A BALLISTIC MISSILE 
DEFENSE SYSTEM  
 
Willie D. Brown 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., Florida A&M University, 1996 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 























































The United States is in the midst of an ambitious 
effort to build and deploy a wide range of ballistic 
missile defense systems. These ballistic missile defense 
systems will be effective against a host of current and 
postulated threats from ballistic missiles. In this thesis 
study, we explore the process of enhancing the 
effectiveness of weapon assignment for a system of systems. 
First, analysis of information is drawn from current 
proposed system of the ABM and its construction from the 
ground up. This research analyzes two ballistic Missile 
Defense System (BMDS), Aegis and Patriot respectively, 
their attributes, and their current and future roles in a 
Global Ballistic Defense Missile System. In addition, this 
thesis presents a software architecture for the ABM weapon 
assignment component module with object oriented design 
feasibility with integration as the key ingredient. This 
research contributed to highlighting some shortfalls in 
efforts to integrate capabilities and desired capabilities 
as the missile threat evolves and presents recommendations 
for follow-on research to improve ABM’s weapon assignment 
capabilities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
The area of research and purpose of this thesis is to 
develop an object-oriented design for a cooperative weapons 
assignment weapon module for a system-of-systems within the 
Advanced Battle Manager (ABM) framework focusing on the 
strategies for weapon targeting and weapon pairing for 
ballistic missile defense. The research will involve 
studies of missiles and weapon profiles to develop weapon 
assignment constraints. Through classification and thorough 
examination of the threat missile attributes, the target 
threats can be discriminated as benign or suspect and 
distributed for further processing within the weapon 
assignment network. Dynamic command and control and battle 
management functions require fast and effective decision 
aids to provide optimal allocation of resources 
(object/sensor pairing, weapon/target assignment) for 
effective engagement and real-time battle damage 
assessment. The basic Weapon Target Assignment (WTA) 
problem considers the assignment of a set of 
platforms/weapons to a set of targets such that the overall 
expected effect is maximized.  
In this thesis study, we explore the process of 
enhancing the effectiveness of weapon assignment for a 
system of systems. First, analysis of information is drawn 
from current proposed system of the ABM and its 
construction from the ground up. This research analyzes two 
ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), Aegis and Patriot 
respectively, their attributes, and their current and 
future roles in a Global Ballistic Defense Missile System. 
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In addition, this thesis presents a software architecture 
for the ABM weapon assignment component module with object 
oriented design feasibility with integration as the key 
ingredient. This enhances capability to destroy weapon 
classified as a threat to U.S. forces and their allies 
stationed overseas. Strategic placement of assets in the 
correct arena of operation to accomplish missile defense 
objectives is critical. Acquiring and distributing the 
appropriate data in a timely efficient manner reduces 
technological, organizational, and strategic shortcomings.  
1. Weapon Target Assignment 
A key component in planning and controlling the weapon 
target pairing is the assignment function of resources 
(e.g., kinetic kill vehicles, rail guns, and lasers) to 
targets. The Weapon Target Assignment (WTA) problem is to 
find a proper assignment of weapons to targets with the 
objective of maximizing the overall effect associated with 
targets. Various methods for solving this NP-complete WTA 
problem have been reported in past literature. This 
research directs focus at one or more types of weapons 
carried by a set of platforms against a set of targets, and 
extend the basic WTA problem by allowing for multiple 
target assignments per platform as required. In addition, 
investigation may be directed toward how the formulation 
can be applied to collaborative planning where multiple 
sources may be required per target. 
The general dynamical WTA problem is that of a 
defensive battle manager that must allocate defensive 
weapons to offensive threats to maximize the surviving 
value of targeted assets. An asset is defined as any entity 
(or collection of entities) of military importance, ranging 
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from fixed installations like factories, bridges, and 
buildings, to moving objects like battleships, convoys, 
etc. Each asset has a value assigned to it by the defense. 
A threat can be anything potentially causing damage to 
defensive assets. Different threats may be moving at 
different speeds at different distances. Also, a threat may 
suddenly change its course. A weapon may be any means that 
can be used to eliminate a threat. A weapon system is 
assumed to have a certain number of weapons in its 
inventory. Different weapons may require different amounts 
of time to engage the same threat. The number of weapons, 
the number of threats, and the number of assets may vary as 
function of time. Any weapon can kill any threat in range 
with kill probability dependent on the threat, the weapon, 
and the firing time. It is assumed that the defense knows 
how many offensive threats there are at each moment during 
an attack and against which asset each threat is directed. 
During a hostile engagement, the battle manager must 
initiate a set of consecutive actions. The initial 
defensive response is threat detection and identification. 
The threats are then prioritized according to their danger 
to the asset. Rule-based methods are used to generate a 
schedule of events to counter the attack and prevent the 
threats from hitting the asset. A schedule is a finite, 
discrete-time indexed list of decision instants with 
associated events. The problem is to maximize the expected 
surviving defensive values by determining the best firing 
schedule over time given the number of weapons to defend 
the number of assets against the number of threats. The 
number of weapon and the number of threats can possibly 
result in a large problem.   
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B. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
The earliest recorded use of powered missiles in 
warfare was in 1232 at the military siege of Kaifeng, 
former capital of the Chinese province of Henan, in which 
rockets were used to set fire to tents and wicker-work 
fortifications. European technology developed these rockets 
into larger and longer-range weapons. In 1807, for example, 
Copenhagen and a large French fleet in its harbor were 
almost totally destroyed by a British naval attack using 
thousands of iron rockets. The national anthem of the 
United States reflects the common use of these weapons in 
naval battles in the 17th and 18th centuries, when Francis 
Scott Key saw the American flag "by the rocket’s red 
glare."  
The first true ballistic missile — one that has a 
brief period of powered flight, continues on a ballistic 
trajectory outside the atmosphere, then curves back to an 
impact point on earth — was developed at the end of World 
War II. Serious efforts to find a defense against ballistic 
missiles began shortly after the first German V-2 slammed 
into London, without success. Overall, the United States 
has spent more than $100 billion (in current dollars) in 
the pursuit of missile defense since the mid-1950s (plus 
$17 billion on the Patriot system, developed separately by 
the Army as an anti-aircraft system.) The United States 
remains the only nation devoting a significant portion of 
its national defense budget to missile defense.  
President Eisenhower began the search for a defense to 
these missiles when he authorized the operational 
development of a nuclear-tipped interceptor missile, Nike-
Zeus, and commissioned Project Defender to develop 
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components for a nationwide ballistic missile defense 
system. In the late 1960s, President Richard Nixon approved 
the deployment of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) system, in response to the Soviet development of an 
ABM system around Moscow. Although many in Congress were 
concerned that the system would be ineffective, vulnerable 
to attack, and easily overwhelmed, it was approved in order 
not to undermine America’s negotiating position in the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 
In 1972, the Soviet Union and the United States 
announced the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 
1) as well as an agreement limiting defensive systems--the 
ABM Treaty. Both nations agreed "that effective measures to 
limit anti-ballistic missile systems would lead to a 
decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear 
weapons." In attaining both of these agreements at the same 
time, the negotiators intended to ensure strategic 
stability by stopping large scale deployment of strategic 
defensive systems while attempting to limit offensive 
forces.  
The broad purpose of the ABM Treaty is to prevent 
either party from fielding a nationwide ballistic missile 
defense of its territory. The Treaty prohibits the 
development, testing or deployment of sea-based, air-based, 
space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems, as well as 
components based on advanced physical principles. The U.S. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency notes the ABM Treaty is 
designed to "decrease the pressures of technological change 
and its unsettling impact on the strategic balance." 
The proven logic behind the prohibition against a 
nationwide defense is that an arms race in strategic 
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defense systems fosters the proliferation of offensive 
missiles and the development of countermeasures to defeat 
the defense. 
The ABM Treaty permitted a limited deployment of 
defenses. Russia for years maintained a site of 100 
nuclear-tipped interceptors around Moscow. Administration 
officials have always been confident that United States 
missiles could penetrate and overwhelm this defense. If the 
Soviets had deployed more advanced or proliferated 
defenses, the United States would surely have deployed more 
advanced devices to ensure the continued capability to 
penetrate. Russian officials recently indicated that they 
have recently taken all nuclear warheads off the Moscow ABM 
interceptors.  
In the Administration of President Gerald Ford, 
officials and military advisors determined that defenses 
permitted to the United States under the Treaty were not 
worth maintaining since they could easily be penetrated by 
Soviet ballistic missiles. As a panel of the George C. 
Marshall Institute (proponents of deploying a space-based 
defensive system) noted during the Star Wars debates of the 
late-1980s, the problems with the 1970s defensive systems 
were that "a 'ground-based' defense is readily overwhelmed 
and that the fixed, ground-based radars on which the system 
depends are 'easily targeted by the Soviets and vulnerable 
to destruction in a surprise attack." Ultimately, although 
the Safeguard system was deployed, it was operational for 
only a few months in the mid-1970s, and then shut down as 
obsolete. Under President Jimmy Carter, the United States 
continued an active research program into strategic 
defenses, averaging just under $1 billion per year. At the 
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beginning of the Reagan Administration, the consensus in 
the defense community was that ballistic missile defenses 
could not be militarily effective. Some, however, disagreed 
and promoted two systems — High Frontier and space-based 
lasers — each considered by the Reagan Administration and 
rejected before the President's surprise "Star Wars" speech 
of March 23, 1983. (CIR) 
The 1991 Gulf War was the first test of a ballistic 
missile defense in actual combat and the first successful, 
if inadvertent, use of countermeasures. Those engagements 
between missiles contain lessons for engineers on both the 
attacking and defending sides. Scuds launched from Iraq 
spiraled during reentry! Outmaneuvering the slower, less 
agile Patriot interceptors, and disintegrated at random, 
their debris creating false targets that disrupted the 
Patriot homing process. For the most part, the Patriot's 
combat environment was shaped by the unexpected behavior of 
the attacking Scuds-this striking fact alone showing that 
the U.S. weapon's performance depended on the 
characteristics of both the defense and the attacking 
missiles. As it happens, the countermeasures that defeated 
the Patriot were probably unintended and their effects 
accidental. But this first experience with missile defense 
is a warning that the existence of countermeasures cannot 
be ignored. Evidently, it would be wise to examine some of 







1.  Purpose of Study  
The Department of Defense has been successfully 
exploiting rapidly developing advances in information 
technology for military gain. On tomorrow's 
multidimensional battlefield or "battlespace" the increased 
density, acuity, and connectivity of sensors and many other 
information devices may allow U.S. Armed Forces to see 
almost everything worth seeing in real or near-real time. 
Such enhanced vision of the battlespace is no doubt a 
significant military advantage, but a question remains: 
“How do we achieve dominant battlefield knowledge, namely, 
the ability to understand what we see and act on it 
decisively”? The implementation of the Advanced Battle 
Manager (ABM not to be confused with the Anti-ballistic 
missile) shall be able to address the most critical aspects 
of that problem.  
If the United States develops the means to 
acquire dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK), how 
might that affect the way it goes to war, the 
circumstances under which force can and will be 
used, the purposes for its employment, and the 
resulting alterations of the global geomilitary 
environment? Of particular interest is how the 
authors view the influence of DBK in light of the 
shift from global to regional stability issues 
that marks the post-Cold War world. While no 
definitive answer has yet emerged, it is clear 
that the implications of so profound a change in 
military technology are critical to the structure 
and function of the U.S. Armed Forces. (LIBICKI) 
The basis of the analysis for the ABM design for the 
weapon assignment weapon module will be derived from a 
comprehensive analysis of existing missile defense systems 
for compatibility, expansion, growth, and proven capability 
through testing and performance through the years for 
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ballistic missile defense. “Prioritizing our efforts 
against the most important threats, maintaining focus on 
those threats, accomplishing the research, conducting data 
base maintenance, and long term analytic projects required 
to maintain our analytic depth and generally being 
proactive instead of reactive will all become more 
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II. WEAPON ASSIGNMENT  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of the ABM Weapon Assignment component is to 
accurately utilize the functionality associated with the 
different weapon systems. This chapter of the thesis will 
address and discuss the execution of how the ABM tactical 
operations battle management, command and control, 
communications, and intelligence behave with regards to 
developing a set of requirements for the framework of the 
ABM.  We will explore both the Patriot PAC-3 and Aegis 
missile system in the following two chapters. In a 
ballistic missile defense automated system engagement 
sequence, a performance of search and detection, tracking, 
identification, threat evaluation, engagement decision, 
weapon assignment, engagement planning and execution, and 
kill assessment are all time critical and take place under 
high stress. In accordance with Caffalls’ framework, 
information drawn from the track processing will undergoes 
discrimination computation. By thoroughly examining the 
weapon assignment component of the ABM, future research and 
further tailoring for the system can be discovered. 
1. ABM Weapon Assignment Overview  
Since the track data will represent three track types, 
threat, benign, or suspect respectfully, the system 
processing and discrimination of the weapon assignment 
component only needs to direct primary focus toward threat 
tracks. Since there will be an interface addressing pre-
conditions, post-conditions, and other invariants that are 
vital to correlation within the constraints of the 
specified timeframe through a thorough process of 
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elimination, all threat tracks will be correlated and 
displayed within the Kill Data Store. The goal of the 
weapon assignment processing initiates and commences 
dispensation of assigning a weapon system to engage each 
track in Kill Data Store.  
The polling of the weapon assignment processor will 
occur at a specified time of every two seconds. The polling 
takes a threat track from the top of the stack and sends 
the track to the iPrioritize interface which will address 
pre-condition, post conditions and invariants. (CAFFALL) A 









Figure 1: Weapon Assignment Processing Component (From 
[CAFFALL], pp 144,145) 
 
Incorporated inside the weapon assignment processing 
component is the track prioritization computation to 
determine the priority of the tracks based upon a 
Prioritized Defended Asset List (PDAL) which will be 
further outlined in Chapter V and drawn from Caffalls’ 
framework (p 145). (CAFFALL) Significant events take place 
inside the PDAL which details an algorithmic approach 
toward prioritization in the direction of any assets within 
specified parameters.   
The next feature of the weapon assignment processing 
component is the iWeaponAssignment interface that links 
between weapon assignment processing and weapon assignment 
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computation.  In addition, iWeaponAssignment interface will 
address pre-condition, post conditions and invariants which 
will be further outlined in Chapter V and drawn from 
Caffalls’ framework (p 146). (CAFFALL) 
The next major component of the weapon assignment 
processing component is the Weapon Assignment Computation 
(WAC). The WAC will act as a passive component and perform 
send and receive actions from three different data stores. 
A weapon is assigned to each threat inside this component 
based upon three important characteristics which are 
available weapon system, health and status of available 
weapon system, and rules of engagement. The Weapon System 
Data Store contains information of all weapon systems in 
the BMDS including their range, accuracy, altitude and 
range to intercept maximum number of available launchers, 
reload times, and maximum number of current engagements of 
the weapon system. The Weapon Health and Status Data Store 
contains information that is continually updated of each 
weapon health and status associated within the ABM to 
include the readiness of the weapon, readiness of the 
number of interceptors, current engagement assignments to 
the weapon system as well as current engagements of the 
weapon system. The Rules of Engagement Data Store contains 
information as set forth in the BMD planning phase to 
include shot doctrine and firing trigger listing the 
available shots, probability of kill, and the desired 
interceptor reserve. In addition, the WAP sends and 
receives information from the Track Engagement Data Store 
which keeps track of the current engagement status of every 
prioritized track.  
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Further extension of some of the key concepts to 
capture a broader range of the scope of the ABM will be 
elaborated upon.  
• Elements per Target: Some targets contain more 
than one element. This is used when considering 
weapons allocation and when determining the 
resolution required for detection of the target. 
Elements per target can be represented as a table 
of constants indexed by target class.  
• Target Value: Some targets are more important 
than others are. When calculating the platform 
plan or the weapon-target-pairing algorithm, the 
value of a target can be used to select important 
targets for attack. The target value can be 
modeled as a constant for each target class. It 
can be represented as a table of constants 
indexed by target class.  
• Correlation: This concept will play a vital role 
during the processing. Several sensors in the mix 
may see and collect information on the same 
target. This phenomenon is accounted for by 
correlation, a percentage of sensed targets that 
are not duplicates. A correlation of 90 percent, 
for instance, would mean that ten percent of 
sensed targets are duplicates, and 90 percent of 
sensed targets are separate targets. Correlation 
can be represented as a constant.  
• Engagement Time Requirements: The minimum time 
from the tasking of a weapon platform until the 
weapon engages the target, represented as a table 
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of time requirements indexed by platform type and 
range band.  
• Weapon Target Location Error (TLE): The accuracy 
with which the target location must be known in 
order to use a weapon effectively. TLE for a 
target is compared to the weapon TLE requirement 
when allocating weapons. Weapon TLE requirements 
can be represented by a table of TLEs indexed by 
weapon.  
• Health and Status Inventory: The numbers of 
weapons incorporated among all weapons launch 
platforms in all of the AORs represented as a 
table indexed by type of weapon.  
Defensive weapons being allocated from any AOR weapon 
platform must share some common characteristics such as 
small reaction time, extremely high probability of success 
and multiple simultaneous engagements capability. Having 
those common characteristics will result in autonomous 
operation of the weapon suites from detection to 
engagement.  A bidding process will aid in weapon 
assignment precluding the expenditure of multiple weapons 
from different weapons platforms on one target. Each weapon 
system will evaluate the threat and determine its 
evaluation of probability of kill and then place a bid for 
destruction of the target to the ABM weapon assignment 
processing components.    
Because of the complexity and size of the planning 
space and the number of possible combinations of options 
and constraints that must be considered, manual planning 
methods and most current automated methods may appear to be 
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inadequate. They may emerge as narrowly focused, 
inflexible, time consuming, and not scalable. As options or 
constraints are added, the ABM plan complexity increases 
several folds which add to the time necessary to develop 
the plan. Weapon performance from the US and its Allies 
will depend on the characteristics of both the defenses and 
the attacking missiles.  
2. Analysis of the ABM Weapon Assignment  
A threat will generate a set of weapons pairs. Each 
threat or weapon pair will consist of the threat and the 
effective weapon resource that is capable of defeating the 
threat. A generic algorithm will select a unique weapon 
pair from among the weapon platform options based upon 
doctrines and resources.  The interceptor must be able to 
engage a target coming from any number of directions, at 
different speeds and ranges, and at many different points 
along the axis and engaging multiple targets at once which 
will be further outlined in Chapter V.  
The ABM will attempt to capture the increase speed of 
classification and discrimination for a ballistic object 
while ensuring consistency across a distributed 
architecture. In addition, the ABM will increase the 
understanding of target identification, threat 
classification and discrimination, weapon selection, weapon 
target assignment, and hit to kill assessment.  
Within the stated concepts of the ABM, the models 
capture a valuation of targets and assets. A target’s value 
consists of two components: intrinsic value and dynamic 
value. Intrinsic value reflects the campaign-wide impact of 
the survival of the target, while dynamic value represents 
the immediate capacity of the target to inflict damage on 
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friendly assets. The value of an available weapon asset 
also consists of intrinsic and dynamic components. The 
intrinsic component includes the value of all strike and 
support weapon platforms in their cognate AORs and the 
dynamic component captures the opportunity cost of 
diverting the weapon asset from the originally planned AOR 
mission to a TCT prosecution. 
The framework will also support the evaluation of all 
possible weapon-target pairs. The value of a weapon-target 
pair if taken as an assignment is the net of an adjusted 
target value minus an adjusted weapon asset value. The 
adjusted target value is the target value (defined above) 
multiplied by the probability of target kill by the weapon 
asset. The probability of target kill is in turn a function 
of the probability of weapon asset’s safe ingress to the 
target area, the probability of target acquisition by the 
asset’s on-board sensors, and the probability of target 
destruction with the weapon load on the asset. For the 
adjusted weapon asset value, the weapon asset’s intrinsic 
value (defined above) is multiplied by the probability of 
the weapon asset being killed in the assignment while its 
dynamic value or the opportunity cost (defined above) will 
be included in full regardless of the weapon asset being 
killed or not. The probability of a weapon asset being 
killed is calculated from the probability of its safe 
ingress and the probability of its safe egress, both of 
which depend on the threats present on the asset’s flight 
route. 
The ABM will provide guidance in the determination of 
an optimal pairing plan.  With all possible weapon-target 
pairs evaluated and each assigned with a value, the pairing 
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optimization will be invoked to determine the best 
assignment of available weapon assets to Time Critical 
Targets (TCT) so that the overall value is maximized. A 
generic algorithm will have to be constructed for 
optimization through variation similar to the problem known 
in operations research as the assignment problem. During 
the process of time critical engagement coordination, 
numerous decisions have to be considered as well as a 
multiplicity of questions as follows: 
-How to allocate resources effectively  
-What specific area of concentration 
-Payload of the target and where it is headed 
-Number of shots and when to take the shot 
-Target selection choices and who should shoot at what  
-When can the interceptor divert to intercept another 
target if required? 
-Can the interceptor be redirected to intercept other 
targets within the threat area? 
-Was the engagement successful or is there a need to 
reengage the threat corridor (MITRE) 
The process can be described in the following 
functional area of a Threat Priority Evaluation and Weapon 
Assignment module. The Threat Priority Evaluation and 
Weapons Assignment will allocate assets to targets, 
estimate asset damages, and generate a selected number of 
engagements. ABM force operations will provide each AOR 
commander a set of areas of responsibility and rules of 
engagement for operational response to encounterable 
threats. The ABM will provide commanders an attribute of 
20 
engagement control which will monitor remote and local 
engagements. The Threat Priority Evaluation and Weapons 
Assignment component module utilizes discrimination 
computation with correlation to determine the best refined 
technique for neutralizing the threat.  This module will 
consist of the three additional major parts in addition to 
addressing the threat and engagement.  
• Threat Evaluation:  associates targets to assets 
and estimates asset damage using a greedy 
optimization strategy that is based upon a 
likelihood function.  
• Generate Engagements: a set of candidate 
engagements is produced using an interpolation 
method that will take place inside the seven data 
stores encompass inside the weapon assignment 
processing component. This will primarily poll 
each of the kill data stores individually to meet 
all timing and geometry constraints.  
• Select Engagements: selects the set of 
coordinated engagements which satisfies the rules 
of engagement within the collective timing and 
resource constraints. 
Once a threat has been evaluated and an acceptable 
engagement has been determined, the Weapon assignment 
processing component will transmit the necessary messages 
to the selected launcher and supporting radar for intercept 
and engagement. At the same time, there has to be critical 
communication and precise coordination for the engagement 
status for follow through.  This will play a pivotal role 
in determining the success of the module. Furthermore, 
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there are other specifications and considerations that 
should involve determination of actions to be taken which 
are as follows: weapon type used (conventional or nuclear), 
Arena in which the actions occurs (strategic or theater), 
type of action (preempt, defend, deny, destroy, retaliate, 
etc), and percent of damage expected before constraints. In 
conjunction, consideration for another tool suggest an 
assessment tool to further examine attributes of targets in 
the database such as error radius, hardness, mobility, 
population density, priority, target class, and 
environmental conditions.  
An additional fielding of a critical characteristic 
can be broken down inside the target class as follows: 
mobility (mobile or fixed), type of base (missile, air, or 
submarine), type of facility (nuclear, chemical, or 
biological), type of center (command or population), and 
whether it is a time-critical target or any other fielded 
element. Under the importance of the target value, ranking 
can be listed as follows: highest, high, medium and low. 
(ELLIS)   
3. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Systems 
The resulting, and current modeling of missile defense 
programs consists of four systems, three of which (Navy 
Area excepted) use hit-to-kill interceptors (see Table 1):  
a. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) is 
designed to intercept missiles at altitudes below 25 
km (low-endoatmospheric), acquiring its targets using 
a radio-frequency seeker.  
b. The Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile 
Defense (TBMD) utilizes an enhanced Standard Missile 
for low-endoatmospheric intercept, homing on targets 
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with an infrared seeker. Navy Area TBMD exploits the 
considerable investment already made in AEGIS cruisers 
and destroyers equipped with SPY radars. 
c. The Theater High-Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) system targets missiles at altitudes above 40 
km, both inside (high endoatmospheric) and outside the 
atmosphere (exoatmospheric). THAAD is a ground-based 
system using infrared terminal guidance.  
d. The Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) TBMD system 
intercepts missiles exoatmospherically (at altitudes 
in excess of 100 km), also using infrared homing and 
AEGIS sea-basing. The combination of the NTW and THAAD 
programs together will determine the future system 
that excels overall in program performance becoming 
the lead upper-tier system. 
 





PAC-3 Low-endo intercept 2001 
Navy Area TBMD Low-endo intercept 2003 
THAAD High-endo/exo intercept 2007 
NTW TBMD Exo intercept 2007 
Airborne Laser Endo/exo intercept     (boost-phase) TBD 
Table 1.   Active Missile Defense Systems and Capabilities 
 
The core program consists of only land and sea 
components. Beyond these, the lead air component is the 
Airborne Laser (ABL), a Boeing 747 with a high-powered 
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chemical laser capable of intercepting ballistic missiles 
during boost. Endoatmospheric intercept of the burning 
rocket booster is planned; exo-atmospheric intercept of the 
booster should also be possible, provided it continues 
burning above the atmosphere.  
The effectiveness of the weapon assignment module will 
contribute significantly toward threat defense. A solution 
with continuous coverage of enemy missiles, from ascent 
through late midcourse, would require fewer interceptors 
than a single-layer or discontinuous system to achieve the 
same results. If each successive layer can, on cue, 
concentrate on targets that leak through previous layers, 
the number of interceptors per target can be reduced 
without reducing confidence. In addition, the mobility of 
the solution's boost-phase and early midcourse components 
would permit the surging of the system to concentrate on 
suspected threats. Based upon the fielding needs, a system 
of systems would offer more distinct technological options 
to improve kill probability in one or another layer, thus 
reducing the need to respond to more threats with 
proportionally more interceptors.  
With stability within the ABM framework, subsequent 
efforts can be focused toward the threat. Research shows 
that a boost-phase intercept, when feasible, is the surest 
way to defeat most countermeasures because of both the 
opportunity to intercept before most countermeasures can be 
employed (especially sub munitions) and the bright booster 
rocket plume that facilitates target acquisition. The early 
midcourse component also helps by providing advantageous 
intercept ranges, angles, and relative velocities (i.e., 
slower than head-on).  
24 
A "system of systems" can be based on three 
synergistic layers:  
1) Fixed U.S.-based defense, to ensure protection of 
the highest-value target--the homeland--even without 
strategic warning.  
2) At the other end, deployable (with strategic 
warning) boost-phase intercept, to kill threatening 
ballistic missiles, of most any range, when they are first 
detected and before most countermeasures can be employed.  
3) Bridging the two ends, a flexible, deployable 
element capable, with modest warning, of contributing at 
either end and of intercepting ballistic missiles in early 
midcourse.  
The elements of this system of systems, and actual 
missile defense operations, can be integrated by a common, 
mainly space-based sensor and BMC3 system. 
While the ABM structure will divide the world into 
well defined regional areas of responsibility, long range 
missiles do not necessarily remain inside those boundaries, 
nor do the sensors, interceptors, and communications 
infrastructures of a multilayered defense system. Since the 
ABM will focus as a global system of layered defenses, 
defense assets are not confined to a single region of the 
world. The ABM shall direct focus toward rules of 
engagement development from regional combatant commands and 
all the military services to develop and refine tactics, 
techniques, and procedures to counter a ballistic missile 
attack. Defense engagement execution will remain largely 
decentralized. The ABM will demonstrate a layered missile 
defense system that is intended to engage threat missiles 
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of various ranges in various phases of flight. Those phases 
of flight will be able to employ the different types of 
interceptors that operate across many time zones and 
geographic region which may require additional operational 
integration. A reasonable decision of allowing the selected 
weapon platform to defend against a missile through its 
entire flight with multiple shot opportunities at different 
points in the flight of the missile might present another 
concept of advantage but has not been visited due to push 
for coordination of jointness.  
Another interesting aspect of the ABM framework is the 
linking of missile elements on weapon platforms that act in 
conjunction with one another to provide enhanced precision 
solution computation and gives an efficient application of 
missiles assets toward the engagement of single and 
multiple targets. The ABM must monitor battle space within 
and outside every AOR and AOR commanders must be able to 
conduct battle operations while still maintaining 
situational awareness and effectively assess resources and 
support dynamic planning. The ABM must provide for 
execution of defensive, offensive and passive defense 
operations in support of missile defense mission. In the 
case of defensive operations, the AOR commanders should 
recognize and be able to select the best available means to 
engage the incoming threat throughout its flight profile, 
including re-engagements. Additionally, AOR commanders 
should be trained to perform threat evaluation and weapons 
assignment in accordance with ABM framework to accomplish 
execution of operations. AOR commanders will choose either 
the centralized or decentralized method of operations, 
recognizing such factors as the level of command interest, 
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threat, current situation and involvement of multiple 
services or agencies. They will become proficient in 
knowledge of the ABM and its automated battle management 
aids during engagement sequences.  
The AOR commanders must also identify attributes of 
whether there is an attack operations solution to respond 
to the air and missile threat. Through practice, the AOR 
commanders determine if the point of origin or other 
threat-related target such as infrastructures are 
engageable through attack operations options. If so, they 
will propose the selection of the best available attack 
operation option, including preplanned or dynamic 
targeting, and then monitors the attack engagement. After 
the attack, they will perform a re-attack assessment and 
select the best available re-attack option, if necessary. 
To fulfill this responsibility, AOR commanders will have to 
be well versed in offensive counter air operations. 
ABM system knowledge must cover positioning or 
repositioning of resources, force protection, sensor 
coverage, weapons coverage, asset protection, post-
engagement debris fall-out, communications ranges and 
logistics support in order to provide sound recommendations 
for execution of the missile threat or mission. If the ABM 
prioritize the threat and concludes that an enemy missile 
is going to hit a high value target, the system will choose 
to engage it with one of the many systems from the multiple 
weapon launch platforms. If there is a target that is a 
threat but no longer worth defending (destroyed earlier) it 
will not defend against it. The ABM must decide how many 
missiles it is willing to assign against an incoming 
missile threat.  
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The individual potential weapon launch platforms are 
critical and necessary to the support countering the threat 
and upholding operations. The weapon assignment portion of 
the ABM will present a dynamic defense in depth which will 
be fought across time and distance, engaging the enemy in 
every phase of their operations throughout the battlespace. 
Combined joint forces will engage the enemy as a 
functioning system, overcoming defensive tendencies to 
react to the enemy as a collection of independent threats. 
The dynamic defense in depth will again key on the windows 
of opportunity to disrupt or destroy the enemy’s processes. 
The in-depth defense will aid in the synchronization of 
countering the threat of operational elements in decisive, 
high-tempo tactical operations. AOR commanders and their 
forces integrate their tactical actions, implementing the 
guidance and requirements from centralized planning. 
 
B. CONCLUSION  
Since the ABM will cross many layers of defense, 
weapon launch platforms must conduct prompt in-depth, 
decisive action against theater missiles in flight. 
Layering is particularly important to effective active 
defense, and increasingly extends to long distances inland 
and to exoatmospheric space. Ideally, forward-stationed 
Aegis ships and combat aircraft will promptly engage 
theater missiles in enemy airspace, primarily through 
network supported coordination utilizing air-to-air or 
surface-to-air missiles. In addition, weapon platforms that 
are designated as the first line in multiple engagement 
opportunities encompass the capability to use stand-off, 
long-range weapons effectively enabling prompt and early 
engagement. Ascent phase interception by Navy Theater-Wide 
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interceptors is the most effective active defense against 
long-range TBMs. Fighters may be positioned anywhere 
between the source of the threat and the protected forces 
and assets. Armed with long-range, mid-range, and short-
range air-to-air missiles, majority of the launch platforms 
will form an exceptionally flexible, strong defense when 
supported by long-range air surveillance and electronic 
warfare assets. Surface-to-air missile systems from Navy 
surface combatants and Marine or Army ground forces also 
cover a significant portion of the airspace between enemy 
airbases and launch positions and defended forces and 
assets, combining dispersed, often overlapping capabilities 
for point defense and area defense against all threats. The 
weapon assignment processing component of the ABM will 
ensure prompt engagement of enemy missile threats and will 
extend attack operations into the launch and post-launch 
periods. Defense measures have to be taken by AOR 
commanders in the targeted area focusing on detecting 
attacks and providing timely warning.  
Therefore, there is a tremendous need for timely and 
responsive command, control, and communications for target 
assignment, defense weapon release, damage assessment, and 
reassignment if necessary. The time available for a space 
based element to react during the boost phase may be so 





A. SEA-BASED SYSTEMS 
In the U.S. there are two different naval TMD 
programs: Navy Area Defense and Navy Theater Wide. Navy 
Area Defense is mainly designed to protect military forces, 
airfields, ports and other valuable assets. Its weapon 
systems are for lower-tier defense. Missiles for this 
program are already in service such as the Standard 
Missile-2 (SM-2) which has been modified for improved 
capabilities. Navy Theater Wide is under development and 
will be able to destroy enemy ballistic missiles at 
altitudes higher than 100 km. For this purpose the Standard 
Missile-3 (SM-3) and Airborne Laser (ABL) is being 
developed. The ABL will destroy TBMs during their boost 
phase. Interceptor missiles can be either the THAAD or SM-3 
missile. The future role of the navy in TMD hinges on 
successful tests.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Coalition experience in Operation DESERT STORM in 
combating the SCUD Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) was 
ineffective and seriously jeopardized the cohesiveness of 
the coalition. In spite of a well-conducted air campaign 
using a thoroughly compiled target list in complete air 
superiority, an estimated 90 SCUDs were launched against 
coalition forces in Saudi Arabia and at Israel. To keep the 
Coalition together, thirty percent of the theater's allied 
tactical aircraft assets were shifted from battlefield air 
interdiction missions supporting the land campaign, to 
locating and attacking SCUD launch vehicles. Destruction of 
a TBM launch vehicle by a tactical aircraft was unseen and 
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not accomplished. Additionally, post-war analysis of the 
active TBM defense by the PATRIOT missile system revealed 
interception rates far below what was first claimed. 
Because of their substandard construction and the 
modifications necessary to achieve an increased range, 
Iraqi SCUDs were unbalanced in their downward flight. Their 
erratic, corkscrewing descent caused many TBMs to break 
into fragments and self-destruct, inadvertently confusing 
the ground radars. Those that didn't break up were 
particularly difficult to intercept due to their 
unintentionally effective, maneuvering, final flight path. 
1. Overview of Missile Defense from the Sea 
Since most of the Earth's surface is covered by water, 
ships carrying interceptors can cruise to locations that 
are in reach of almost every potential trouble spot. The 
U.S. Navy's current fleet of Aegis cruisers already 
deployed around the world could be quickly ordered to 
various locations to establish a defensive shield between 
hostile states and the countries they threaten with missile 
attack. Using them would present relatively few political 
problems if the need arose to deploy such defenses during a 
regional crisis. 
Stationed near the coasts of potentially threatening 
states, these ships could intercept and destroy enemy 
missiles in the ascent phase and in some cases in the boost 
phase of their trajectory. In the open seas, they could 
target enemy missiles in their mid-course phase. Deployed 
close to home or near the coastlines of America's allies, 
they could hit incoming missiles or warheads at the 
terminal phase of trajectory. Each phase presents different 
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defense opportunities as well as different threats and 
risks. 
Sea-based systems offer the most cost-effective 
protection from ballistic missiles and are the most readily 
available because the U.S. Navy already has cruisers 
deployed that are capable of fielding these systems. The 
earliest, least expensive way to achieve a global defense 
would be to build upon the nearly $50 billion that the 
United States has invested in the Aegis system to provide 
defense against enemy aircraft and cruise missiles.  
The Aegis system will provide protection against 
missile attacks for a limited area with the Navy Area Wide 
Defense program. For maximum effectiveness, the Aegis system 
would need to exploit targeting information obtained from 
radar and other sensors that are not located with the 
interceptors, such as space-based sensors. This will aid 
with the interceptors launched from Aegis cruisers whether 
in the Sea of Japan, the Mediterranean Sea, the North 
Atlantic, or the North Pacific could successfully intercept 
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles launched from 
North Korea, North Africa, or the Middle East toward 
targets around the world, including the United States. 
2. Aegis Concept of Operation 
The MDA and the USN are jointly developing Aegis BMD 
as part of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). To 
date, eight Aegis destroyers from a planned total of 15 
have been upgraded with a Long Range Surveillance and 
Tracking (LRS&T) capability, while two Aegis cruisers have 
been outfitted with the LRS&T upgrade and given an 
emergency engagement capability against short- and medium-
range ballistic-missile threats using the Aegis BMD Weapon 
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System and the SM-3 . A third Aegis cruiser will be given 
the same upgrade. (JANES) 
3. Advantages of Sea-Based System  
Sea-based TMD systems have several advantages over 
land-based systems. They are flexible and can be deployed 
outside territorial waters without the co-operation of a 
host nation and also without necessarily raising 
international tensions. At the same time they can cover a 
vast area of land. These systems consist of a combination 
of: 
•  missiles (for air warfare and for destroying launch 
stations), 
•  combat data systems (for processing incoming 
information from satellites, early warning aircraft and the 
ships’ own radar systems),  
•  radar technology (for finding the TBM and guiding the 
missiles to their targets).  
The ground-based system will be more expensive than a 
sea-based option because it would have to be built from the 
ground up. The sea-based option takes advantage of the 
significant investment America already has made in the U.S. 
Navy's fleet of Aegis cruisers. The long range ground-based 
system will be less effective because it must intercept 
warheads in space while they are traveling at their 
greatest velocity but after they could release their 
decoys. The military would have only one opportunity to 
shoot down the missile before the terminal stage. Sea-based 
defenses can be forward-deployed near potentially hostile 
sites to shoot missiles down during their ascent phase -
when they are most visible, not yet up to optimum speed, 
33 
and have not released their warheads or decoys. Moreover, 
should the first attempt fail, there is still time to 
launch a second or even third intercept attempt. Because of 
their mobility, ships can respond to changing world 
conditions. 
4. Sea-Based Defense Attributes 
According to international law, a U.S. warship is 
sovereign U.S. territory. This simple fact remains constant 
wherever the vessel operates. A warship operating in 
international waters is not hindered by many of the 
political constraints and over flight restrictions that may 
interfere with ground-based or air operations. Normally, 
ships stationed offshore are not obtrusive; as conflicts 
erupt, ground based forces, which are very visible may 
potentially escalate conflicts. Naval forces are truly 
expeditionary in nature. Although the other armed services 
flaunt this same capability, the fundamental difference is 
the Navy-Marine Corps performs this function through 
forward presence instead of continental U.S. based assets. 
As the U.S. continues to withdraw from overseas bases, 
naval forces will play a vital role in potential crisis 
situations. Navy surface combatants normally operate in 
potential threat areas, or can be rapidly repositioned to 
crisis areas. These forces are self-sufficient and can 
remain on station indefinitely. 
More than seventy-five percent of the world’s land 
mass is bordered by water. Many of the areas are located 
where future conflicts are likely to materialize and are 
within the Navy’s capability to project power. The U.S. 
usually recognizes a 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial sea 
limit which means that Aegis surface combatants operating 
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in a near land environment can be stationed closer to 
anticipated TBM launch points or predicted impact points. 
C. PAST HISTORY AND WHY AEGIS IS A SOUND ASSET  
The Navy TBMD program maximizes the use of existing 
technology and past investments in the Aegis, Standard 
Missile and command and control (C2) systems 
infrastructure. The nation has already invested billions of 
dollars in the production of 22 Aegis cruisers and more 
than 30 Aegis destroyers. The Standard Missile SM-2 Block 
IVA missile used for TBMD is a modified Standard Missile 
the Navy had already procured for TAD. The various blocks 
of Standard Missiles have been the Navy’s primary surface-
to-air weapon for over 30 years and represent a 1 billion 
dollar investment. Aegis ships have state of the art C2 
suites initially designed to support large scale, blue 
water air wars. The TBMD mission is an extension of the 
Aegis surface combatant’s primary role — air defense. 
Therefore, there will be no requirement for additional 
manning, training or logistics to support this mission. 
1. Standard Missile 
The Aegis Weapons System, with its Standard Missile, 
provides a robust area Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) capability 
against threat aircraft and Anti Ship Cruise Missiles 
(ASCMs) when conducting operations in the littoral areas. 
By providing this Area AAW shield, the Standard Missile is 
the enabler for operations close to land. For example, 
Aegis cruisers and destroyers can engage the F-1 Mirage 
aircraft and its electronic jamming techniques using the 
SM-2 Block IIIB missile at ranges up to 80 nm. If the 
Mirage launches ASCMs such as the Exocet, the SM-2 is 
relied upon to decrement the incoming raid by one half 
prior to engagement by self-defense weapons systems. 
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The SM-2 Block IV is an extended range variant of the 
Standard Missile that has reached initial operational 
capability (IOC) since FY99. The Block IV can engage threat 
aircraft and ASCMs at ranges up to 100 nm. It can engage 
stand off jamming aircraft beyond 100nm. It will also 
provide an increased capability against maneuvering ASCMs 
over earlier Standard Missile variants. 
Both the SM-2 Block IIIB and the SM-2 Block IV 
missiles build on the foundation of excellence that has 
been proven reliable and in good standing with respect to 
the Standard Missile family. The SM-2 Block IIIB completed 
final operational testing and evaluation with a “grand slam 
of sorts” – 9 for 9 hits against incoming targets. The 
missiles weren’t special missiles; they were production 
missiles which are the types being fielded today. The Block 
IV missile has completed testing and initial operational 
capability (IOC). 
2. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
Positioning theater ballistic missile defense at sea 
can provide deterrence and war winning leverage. 
Capitalizing on the inherent flexibility of surface ships, 
TBMD at sea frees us from the need to provide land-based 
terminal defenses around every potential target we wish to 
protect. In the littoral, on-scene surface combatants can 
immediately influence events because they are combat ready 
and can sustain themselves independent of host nation 
support. In short, forces are position in a way to provide 
the most effective coverage against any encounter. 
3. Navy Area TBMD 
The mission of the Navy Area TBMD system is to provide 
US and allied forces, as well as areas of vital national 
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interest, defense against TBMs. In support of forcible 
entry and sustained ground combat operations, such as those 
associated with an amphibious landing, Navy TBMD forces 
provide the earliest capability when the heaviest TBM 
attack intensity is likely and when other TBMD systems are 
still enroute or are only present in limited numbers. The 
Navy Area TBMD System will provide protection against short 
and medium-range TBMs for debarkation ports, coastal 
airfields, amphibious objective areas (AOAs) and 
expeditionary forces as they move from the sea towards 
their objective ashore. The Navy Area TBMD program consists 
of modifications to the AEGIS AN/SPY-1 radar to enable 
detection, tracking and engagement of TBMs using a modified 
SM-2 and minor changes to existing C2 systems. More than 50 
AEGIS cruisers and destroyers are at-sea or under 
construction and the support, training and logistics 
infrastructure is already in place and operating. The plan 
includes: 
•  Software/firmware modifications to AEGIS Combat 
System including SPY-1 radar 
•  Development of changes to the SM-2 missile by 
incorporation of an infrared seeker, an improved fuze and 
modified warhead section to create the Block IV-A variant 
The computer program and equipment installations have 
been completed as well as successful sea trials.  
4. Navy Theater Wide TBMD 
The Navy Theater Wide (NTW) Program builds upon the 
modifications to the AEGIS Combat System that provide Navy 
Area System capability, but provides fundamentally 
different and yields unique capabilities. Specifically, it 
is capable of exoatmospheric and ascent phase intercepts 
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and has a vastly greater defended footprint. This Theater-
Wide capability will enable AEGIS ships operating near 
launch areas to fully exploit their mobility, endurance, 
and forward presence to defend U.S. forces or allies in key 
world regions. The large defended operational areas 
afforded by NTW result in extensive flexibility for the 
joint commanders for their AOR’s in accomplishing TBMD. A 
few ships can simultaneously protect many critical assets 
in the theater of operations as well as provide defense 
against longer ranged TBMs fired elsewhere. The NTW system 
provides a defensive overlay for Navy Area and land based 
TBMD systems. This overlay yields the opportunity to use 
layered defense for high value assets and target areas 
critical to achieving the C2BMC objectives. This will yield 
high cumulative kill probability where it is needed most 
and the flexibility to provide significant protection over 
much of the theater. This is especially important where 
mobile forces may move out from under the less mobile land 
based TBMD umbrella. Where geography or threat capabilities 
preclude forward placement of ships, external cueing from 
space assets or ground based radars enable employment of 
NTW over large operational areas. Engagements are possible 
with midcourse ship locations and terminal ship locations. 
For longer threat ranges, ships must be located closer to 
the defended areas to support engagement. However, even in 
these locations, NTW yields shoot-look-shoot opportunities 
when supported by Navy Area or ground based TBMD systems. 
(SENATE) 
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) will 
provide an efficient and highly mobile sea-based defense 
against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in their 
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midcourse phase. At present, each Aegis cruiser and 
destroyer is outfitted with the Aegis Weapon System—the 
heart of which is the AN/SPY-1 radar system. AN/SPY-1 sends 
out beams of electromagnetic energy in all directions, thus 
allowing Aegis ships to track up to 100 targets 
simultaneously, while still retaining the ability to 
counter other air, surface, and submarine threats. AN/SPY-1 
will be able to detect ballistic missiles as they rise 
above the horizon. Once a hostile missile has been 
detected, Aegis BMD will launch its Standard Missile-3 
interceptor from its MK41 Vertical Launching System 
(currently deployed on Aegis cruisers and destroyers). Once 
close enough to the ballistic missile, the SM-3 will fire 
its kill vehicle, the Kinetic Warhead (KW), from its 
nosecone. The KW will immediately begin to search for its 
target. It will acquire the ballistic missile using a high-
resolution seeker, and maintain an accurate trajectory 
using its internal navigational system. As it closes on its 
target, the KW will identify the missile’s payload, and 
shift its aim point to ensure a lethal hit. When the KW 
finally slams into the enemy warhead, the kinetic energy of 
the high velocity impact will ensure complete destruction 
of the threat.  
D. OPERATING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT  
“ROE should not delineate specific tactics, should not 
cover restrictions on specific system operations, should 
not cover safety-related restrictions, and should not set 
forth service doctrine, tactics, or procedures. ROE should 
never be ‘rudder orders’ and certainly should never 
substitute for a strategy governing the use of deployed 
forces, in a peacetime crisis or in wartime.”(Roach) 
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Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, The Commander’s Handbook on 
the Law of Naval Operations, states that “U.S. rules of engagement 
reaffirm the right and the responsibility of the 
operational commander generally to seek out, engage and 
destroy enemy forces consistent with national objectives, 
strategy and the law of armed conflict.”(Commander) ROE are 
shaped by operational, political, legal, and diplomatic 
forces, and thus tend to evolve as these forces change over 
time. The unique operational and political characteristics 
of theater ballistic missiles will have a signal impact on 
the evolution of rules of engagement crafted to counter 
them. Rules of engagement for theater ballistic missile 
defense must be shaped by the unique nature of the threat. 
The high velocities attained by TBMs and the potential 
consequences of WMD warhead use argue the need for very 
rapid, if not automatic, engagement. Normally, the 
counterargument set in opposition to such a permissive and 
deadly defensive environment involves the challenge of 
deconfliction, how best to prevent the possible engagement 
of friendly assets. 
However, the very kinematics that makes TBMs such 
challenging targets also aid deconfliction. Quite simply, 
unlike civilian and military aircraft, there is no such 
thing as a friendly incoming TBM. 
1. Near Land Stationing Concerns 
Placing a ship as close as possible to the area to be 
defended could be a promising tactic provided that the 
commander is certain that the country or city in that area 
is the only one targeted by the enemy's TBMs. Located 
within an inshore position, the AEGIS system does perform 
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well, but the inherent mobility of a warship could possibly 
be lost. 
The placement of a ship close to a single area is far 
from optimum, however, because at least one ship would be 
required for each area defended and the debris from 
successful engagements could fall on friendly, heavily-
populated ground. Unfortunately, despite a successful 
intercept, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) could still be 
effective against the target countries, cities and 
population if intercepted too close to the target. 
2. Distant Stationing Concerns 
Stationing a ship farther from the city defends a much 
greater area, has the potential for more kills, and allows 
for debris and the harmful effects of WMDs to fall into the 
sea, away from friendly territory. Distant from land, a 
ship may be able to support joint operations, other phases 
of the naval campaign and joint operations and would be 
free to maneuver to avoid and combat other attacks, 
especially by enemy submarines that prey on ships whose 
maneuvers are too predictable. 
E. AEGIS ROLE IN GLOBAL BALLISITIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
Over the years, MDA has conducted seven SM-3 flight 
tests. Out of those seven, six have been successful. The 
most recent test involved for the first time a “separating” 
target, meaning that the target warhead separated from its 
booster rocket. Previous tests were against unitary (non-
separating) targets representative of “SCUD”-type ballistic 
missiles. The Aegis system is the maritime component of the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System and is designed to 
intercept and destroy short to intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles. The intercept used “hit to kill” technology, 
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which means that the target warhead was destroyed when the 
missile collided directly with the target. President George 
W. Bush has called on MDA to deploy a preliminary defense 
shield—including sea-based assets. In September 2004, the 
Navy deployed an Aegis destroyer in the Sea of Japan 
capable of detecting and tracking missile launches from 
North Korea and China. In the event of a hostile launch, 
the destroyer will be able to transmit data to ten ground-
based interceptors located in Fort Greely in Alaska and 
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California (which have been 
initially deployed since September 2004). During the year 
of 2005, the first fully operational Aegis BMD system has 
been deployed on an Aegis destroyer. MDA will conduct 
rigorous tests, using this initial deployment to integrate 
the AN/SPY-1 with SM-3 and improve the accuracy of the 
interceptor.  
In 2006, the Navy will deploy nine Aegis ships 
outfitted with SM-3 missiles and configured to carry out 
ballistic missile defense operations from almost anywhere 
in the world. During this initial deployment phase, Aegis 
BMD will provide a cost effective means of countering 
emerging threats from rogue nations and terrorists. MDA’s 
long-term goal is to transform Aegis BMD into a 
comprehensive missile defense system capable of destroying 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), possibly in 
their boost phase. As MDA improves its layered missile 
defense system, Aegis BMD will be able to integrate its 
tracking system with other new BMD tracking systems such as 
Space-Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High) satellites, 
the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), or the 
Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX). MDA and the Navy are also 
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considering the development of a larger and faster 



























A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
In spite of the overwhelming victory during the 
Persian Gulf War, the United States and its coalition 
partners were essentially defenseless against Iraq's 
unguided, short-range theater ballistic missiles (TBMs). 
Although militarily insignificant, SCUD missiles proved to 
be a potent political tool. In one incident alone, 27 
American soldiers were killed when a SCUD hit a barracks in 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Some post-war studies suggested that 
the Patriot missile defense system, which was based on a 
recently modified anti-aircraft surface to air missile, was 
only marginally successful in defending against the 
majority of SCUD attacks. (POSTOL) Fragments of Iraqi 
SCUDS, intercepted by Patriot interceptor missiles, fell on 
U.S. and allied territory. If Iraqi SCUD missiles had been 
armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) payloads, 
even successful intercepts would surely have changed the 
nature of the war.   
The employment of ballistic missiles has new strategic 
implications because of the events of September 11, 2001. 
The global war on terrorism involves the newly defined 
“axis of evil,” composed of states capable of producing 
ballistic missiles. Missile technology transfers to third 
world countries threaten world stability, in view 
especially of the possible use of nuclear, chemical or 
biological warheads. If rogue states judge previous missile 
attacks to be successful, such “success” could motivate 
other leaders or terrorists to use their missiles as 
instruments of terror. 
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B. HISTORY OF PATRIOT    
The Patriot surface-to-air missile system is currently 
operational with the U.S. Army and several allied nations. 
The Patriot program was initiated in 1965, but not fielded 
until the early 1980s. Designed to replace the HAWK and 
Nike systems, Patriot was initially intended to intercept 
only air-breathing threats. Each Patriot battery consisted 
of: one radar, eight launchers, 32 missiles and an 
environmental control station (Patriot’s central nervous 
system). It is important to note that Patriot’s phased-
array radar did not provide 360-degree coverage. Patriot 
units tried to compensate for the limitation by overlapping 
radar coverage with other units, and predicting likely 
avenues of attack when positioning their radars. The 
Patriot system has undergone a series of upgrades called 
Patriot Advanced Capabilities (PAC). Shortly before Desert 
Shield a modernization program was initiated to improve the 
system’s capabilities to intercept theater ballistic 
missiles. Patriot upgrades have continued since the Gulf 
War. 
Air operations were not the only means used to counter 
the Iraqi missile threat. The difficulties in hunting Scuds 
from the air were only part of the problem. Ground based 
air defenses, in the form of Patriot surface-to-air 
missiles, were an integral part of the overlapping air and 
missile defense capability deployed in the theater during 
Desert Shield.  
For the first time in history, the Allied coalition 
used a defensive missile to intercept and destroy an 
incoming ballistic missile. The Patriot, which was 
originally designed as an anti-aircraft weapon, was adapted 
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to shoot down ballistic missiles targeted at key cities and 
military targets. Its success, more than any other measure, 
limited the intended effects of Hussein’s terror missiles. 
Hussein launched seven SCUDS’ at Tel Aviv on the second 
night of the Gulf War, which terrorized Israeli civilians. 
On the same night, four Patriots intercepted a SCUD 
launched at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Israel had refused 
Patriots from the United States prior to the war. The act 
assisted in demonstrating the effectiveness of the anti-
ballistic missile system preventing Israel from retaliating 
against Iraq. As a condition for Israeli agreement not to 
retaliate against Iraq, the United States immediately 
shipped thirty-two Patriots and their crews to Israel. 
Throughout the remainder of the war, those Patriot 
missiles successfully intercepted all threatening SCUD’s 
fired at that country. The Patriot system allowed SCUD’s to 
crash into the sea or desert if they posed no threat to 
civilians. The system had a valuable psychological impact 
on the people it protected. The Allied engagement doctrine 
for the Patriot missile was to fire at least two missiles 
at threatening SCUD’s and to allow non-threatening ones to 
explode harmlessly into the Persian Gulf or the desert. Of 
the ninety missiles fired at Saudi Arabia and Israel, 
American crews determined that forty-seven were threatening 
and fired 158 Patriots to intercept them. Initial analysis 
showed that Patriots intercepted forty-five of those forty-
seven SCUD’s for an engagement success rate of 96 percent. 
The Patriots were designed to defend point targets such as 
airfields and ports, not entire cities. They suffered mixed 
results in fending off the Scud attacks; in many cases 
intercepting Patriots deflected the incoming Scuds, leaving 
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the warheads and debris to rain down on Israeli and Saudi 
cities. 
It is worth noting, however, that after the war a 
debate developed over the effectiveness of the intercepts 
in destroying the SCUD warheads and whether or not the SCUD 
and Patriot debris had caused as much damage as the SCUD 
warhead would have. The psychological effects of the 
Patriot elevated Allied and Israeli morale and neutralized 
Hussein’s attempt to terrorize them into a political 
settlement of the conflict.  
C. PATRIOT PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
Patriot Missile Defense System has been an important 
part of our air and missile defense. However, in recent 
years the Patriot system has become even more integral to 
our Theater Missile Defense (TMD) plan. Today it is 
considered to be a core TMD program, with one of the 
highest priorities in the development of Ballistic Missile 
Defense (BMD) systems. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 
(PAC-3) mission is part of the lower tier of the BMD 
architecture. This includes defending troops and fixed 
assets from short and medium range ballistic missiles, CMs, 
and other ABTs such as fixed or rotary wing aircraft. To 
accomplish this mission, the PAC-3 system added the 
capability to destroy enemy threats with hit-to-kill 
accuracy in the terminal phase of the threat missile’s 
flight. The PAC-3 system is planned to be interoperable 
with other Army and Joint systems, to provide a seamless 
missile defense in depth, and to be air transportable to 
support rapid deployments. PATRIOT is the only fielded, 
combat proven, Theater Missile Defense System.  
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Patriot missile does not have to hit the enemy warhead 
in order to destroy it. Each Patriot missile contains a 
fuze, which senses the presence of a target, and a warhead 
with metal fragment to disable or destroy the target and an 
explosive to propel the fragments to the target. When the 
Patriot missile flies close enough to the target to cause 
the Patriot’s fuze to issue a detonation order, the 
fragments are propelled at high velocity toward the target. 
The Patriot fragments that do not cause the target’s 
warhead to explode can damage the warhead to the extent 
that it will either not explode or will not explode with 




Figure 2: Patriot System  
 
The Patriot Firing Battery (FB) consists of eight 
major items of Patriot equipment (see Figure 2). (1) The 
Engagement Control Station (ECS) is the operational and 
maintenance control center of the FB. (2) The Radar Set 
(RS) is the multifunction phased array radar that is 
remotely controlled by the ECS operators. (3) The Launching 
Station (LS) is used to transport, aim, and launch various 
types of Patriot Guided Missiles (GMs). (4) The Antenna 
Mast Group (AMG) is the mobile antenna mast system used to 
carry the amplifiers and antennas associated with the 
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Ultrahigh Frequency (UHF) communication systems in the ECS. 
(5) The Electric Power Plant (EPP) is the prime power 
source for the ECS, RS, and AMG. (6) The Battery Command 
Post (BCP) is the Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)/weapon system interface 
to other battlefield non-real-time digitized information 
systems and provide mission planning and monitoring 
capability to the FB. (7) The Patriot GM is mounted in a 
canister, which functions as a shipping and storage 
container and as a launch tube. (8) The Battery Maintenance 
Group (BMG) consists of the Battery Maintenance Center 
(BMC), Large Repair Parts Transporter (LRPT) and the Small 
Repair Parts Transporter (SRPT). 
The single, multifunction phased array radar performs 
the following functions:  
• High- and Low-Altitude Surveillance 
• Target Detection 
• Target Discrimination 
• Target Identification 
• Target Track 
• Missile Track 
• Missile Guidance (uplink/downlink) 
The missile is command-guided by the radar to a point 
just prior to intercept. At that point, unique TVM guidance 
begins for the pre-PAC-3 missiles, or the active PAC-3 
missile seeker begins to track the target. The RS sends out 
a special waveform that illuminates the target. The RS also 
sends an uplink message that commands the missile to open 
its receiver for detection of reflected TVM waveform energy 
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from the target. The pre-PAC-3 missile encodes and sends 
bore-sight errors via downlink messages back to the RS. 
Guidance computations are then made in the ECS and sent 
back through the radar to the missile via uplink messages. 
This process continues until intercept. This automated 
operation provides firepower at saturation levels many 
times greater than older systems, in addition to a multiple 
simultaneous engagement capability. At the same time, 
Patriot permits a substantial reduction in manpower for any 
given defense level. Standardized circuit modules, Built-In 
Test Equipment (BITE), and automated diagnostics, along 
with fewer system-peculiar major items, provide a 
significant improvement in availability and maintainability 
for lower operating costs. Additionally, the system has a 
remote launch capability of 10km (Phase 1). Using a CRG as 
a Remote Launcher Group (RLG), the FB can provide expanded 
asset coverage to approximately 30km (Phase 3). During the 
first quarter of 2000, the Patriot system successfully 
performed an extended remote launch engagement. 
D. PATRIOT ADVANCED CAPABILITY-3 EVOLUTION 
PAC-3 was developed through a series of evolutionary 
phases which consisted of three increasingly sophisticated 
configurations. These phases were implemented by a series 
of preplanned, incremental, and complementary improvements 
fielded with supporting hardware and software. 
Collectively, these improvements were required to execute 
Air Defense Artillery (ADA) missions in support of 
operations against current and evolving third dimension 
threats. The integration of the PAC-3 missile into the 
Patriot system required modification to the Engagement 
Control Station (ECS), Radar Set (RS), Communication Relay 
Group (CRG), and Launching Station (LS). These changes 
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increased battlespace, improved accuracy, and enhanced 
lethality against all types of TBMs. The improvements also 
enhanced the ABT missions by increasing the detection and 
engagement of LRCS ABTs and TBMs, aircraft flying in 
clutter, and intense ECM environments. Classification, 
Discrimination, and Identification (CDI) was also added, 
allowing the Patriot system to effectively fight in a joint 
(two or more U.S. Armed Forces) or combined (U.S. Armed 
Forces and one or more Allied Forces) air defense 
operations environment, positively identifying ABT’s and 
classifying and categorizing TBMs, aerodynamic warheads, 
penetration aids, and debris. 
1. PAC-3 Configuration 1 
Configuration 1 was the first step toward achieving a 
true PAC-3 system. It consisted of a number of 
improvements, especially in Battle Management, Command and 
Control, Communications, and Intelligence (BMC3I). It also 
incorporated the Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM) which 
increased lethality. Configuration 1 consisted 
predominantly of hardware modifications, primarily to 
support future system growth. These hardware changes 
provided improved system Reliability, Availability, and 
Maintainability (RAM). The changes include the GEM, 
Expanded Weapons Control Computer (EWCC), Optical Disk 
System (ODS), Embedded Data Recorder (EDR), Precision 
Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver (PLGR), 
radar enhancements, automated logistics system, and 
operations and training software improvements. 
2. PAC-3 Configuration 2 
This configuration incorporates several major 
improvements to include Precise Time of Day (PTOD), 
Communications Enhancement (CE) Phase I, Counter Anti-
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radiation Missile (CARM), CDI, Post Deployment Build-4 
(PDB-4), and PDP. 
3. PAC-3 Configuration 2+ 
This is an interim configuration that incorporates 
change to the currently fielded Configuration 2 RS in order 
for the Configuration 2 FBs to run Configuration-3 PDB-5 
software. The RS changes include upgrades to the memory in 
the Signal Processor Group Input/Output Control (SPG IOC) 
and to the memory in the Control Unit Group (CUG) digital 
data processor. BY CY02, all U.S. Patriot units had been 
upgraded to Configuration 2+. This allowed for standardized 
Patriot training and for system compatibility. 
4. PAC-3 Configuration 3 
Configuration 3 is the final phase in a series of 
changes to the Patriot system to meet the PAC-3 program 
requirements. This configuration consists of several 
hardware modifications, a new missile, and the fielding of 
the PDB-5+ software. The PAC-3 program provides enhanced 
system performance against advanced air and missile 
threats, both TBMs and ABTs. These changes are designed to 
improve the search, detection, and tracking capabilities of 
the radar; improve communications within the battalion; 
improve interoperability with joint forces; enable TBM 
launch point determination; and, finally, increase 
lethality against TBMs. In addition, these modifications 
provide increased system RAM and improve operator interface 
functionality and situation awareness. The software build 
was developed to support the hardware modifications and 
user requirements for the PAC-3 program. This software is 
comprised of those changes necessary to support the 
Configuration-3 hardware modification, such as Radar 
Enhancement Phase (REP)-3, CDI Phase 3, Remote Launch 
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Communications Enhancement Upgrade (RLCEU), and the PAC-3 
missile-integration. 
E. SUMMARY OF PAC-3 ATTRIBUTES 
The following list and Table 2 (BARBERA) shows the 
changes and attributes being made to Patriot by the PAC-3 
upgrades.  
• Detection and engagement of lower radar cross-
section (RCS) targets - The threat includes lower 
RCS theater missiles (TMs) and aircraft flying in 
clutter and intense electronic countermeasures 
(ECM) environments.  
• Classification, discrimination, and 
identification (CDI) - To effectively fight in a 
joint and combined air defense (AD) operations 
environment and discriminate targets requires 
Patriot to positively identify air-breathing 
threats (ABTs), and classify or categorize 
tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) and 
aerodynamic missiles. Additionally, the Patriot 
radar discriminates between valid targets and 
penetration aids or debris. 
• Increased firepower and lethality - To respond to 
a growing threat that is capable of conducting 
massed ABT, integrated ballistic and aerodynamic 
missile raids. Increasing multiple simultaneous 
engagement and track handling capabilities, buy 
back required designed battlespace and defense 
effectiveness against stressing and sophisticated 
threat Survivability. Patriot upgrades must 
counter growing lethality on the modern 
battlefield and advances in enemy reconnaissance, 
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intelligence, surveillance, and target 
acquisition (RISTA).  
• Force synchronization/integration - Patriot must 
interoperate with other battlefield operating 
systems (BOS) and have compatibility with future 
Army, joint, and combined command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) 
architectures. 
• Extended range - Patriot must operate at extended 
ranges to disrupt enemy use of the airspace in 
the theater battle space. 
• Patriot-Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) task force operations - Patriot when 
coupled with THAAD, will form an air and missile 
defense task force (AMDTF). Patriot communicates 
with THAAD over the TADIL-J network. Patriot 
software improvements to the ICC allow processing 
a new set of TADIL-J TBM tracks and TBM 
engagement coordination messages between upper 
and lower tier. Integration of AMDTF defenses is 
an evolutionary step forward to protect the force 
against the expanding threat. 
• Training software - Improvements to TPT, OTM, and 
LAT scenarios provide more realistic training for 
ICC and ECS operators. Enhanced ARM and TBM 
scenarios can be scripted and recorded using PAC-
3 missile model. 
• Communication enhancements - Includes upgrades to 
modifications to the ICCs, ECSs, and CRGs. 
Communications are enhanced by upgrading 
communication equipment to provide improved voice 
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and data capabilities, improve the internal and 
external integration of defense alert warning and 
attack operations. Inherent to the communications 
upgrade is the ECS and CRG modifications to 
provide extended remote launch capabilities. This 
provides the commander greater flexibility to 
meet the TBM threat by accessing launchers 
remotely at extended ranges and expands the TBM 
defended area. (BARBERA) 
 The block 3A and 3B versions have the capability to be 
used with the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) for 
over-the-horizon targeting by a remote sensor, or what is 
also called a forward pass intercept. A Cooperative 
Engagement Capability (CEC) has been developed to link 
ballistic missile tracking from Aegis, Patriot and HAWK 
radars together with a data fusion system to allow an 












 PAC- 1     PAC- 2 PAC- 3 
 MIM-104A MIM-104C PAC- 3 
Type Land-mobile, 
surface- to-air 
guided weapon system 






Launcher four-round  












Status Not in production In production  In production 
Length 5.3m 5.18m 5.2m 
Diameter 41cm 41cm 25cm 
Wingspan  92cm 50cm 
Fins Four delta shaped fins  
Launch Weight 914 kg 900kg 312kg 




solid    
propellant 
rocket motor 
Single-stage solid   
propellant rocket 









with TVM and 
semi-active 
homing 
Inertial/Active    
millimeter-wave radar 
terminal homing 
Warhead HE    
single 90 kg 
91kg  




hit-to-kill +  
lethality enhancer  
73 kg  
HE 
blast/fragmentation  
with proximity fuze 
Max speed Supersonic    
(in excess of Mach 
3) 
Mach 5 Mach 5 
Time of flight   minimum nine 
seconds  
  maximum three 
and a half 
minutes  
 
Min altitude  60 meters  
Max attitude NA 24 km 10-15 km 
Min range NA 3 km -- 
Max range - 
anti-air 
70 km 160 km 15 km 
Max range - 
anti-missile 
  15-45 km 





F. POST DEPLOYMENT BUILD  
The Army is now testing the new Patriot PDB-6 software 
build. Below are some of the improvements that will be 
implemented with this software build: 
• Improved classification of targets utilizing new 
technique of calculating ballistic indicator. 
• Continuation of target classification processing after 
launch for targets classified as unmanned ABTs and 
TBM-As to allow further classification to ARM 
• Use of adjustable range gate instead of mini-search 
range gate in order to minimize false alarms and 
detection from near-by targets. 
• Improved cruise missile operator awareness. 
• Provide operator with situational understanding of 
target flight profiles 
• Provide estimated target length of ABT, ARM, AND TBM-A 
tracks by displaying in the FP TRK AMP DATA Tab next 
to the TYPE field. 
• Add a debris indication in the ESTAT field on the TRK 
AMP DATA Tab and TBEQ at the ICC and FP when the 
target is discriminated as debris 
• Add a long-term monitor to recognize the presence of 
interference, which cause false tracks. 
• Modification of the TBM events hardcopy to provide 
additional data.  
• New cruise missile search mode available to operator 
via Tab 1.”  (TPP) 
G. PATRIOTS ROLE IN GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE  
The PAC-3 upgrade has effectively quintupled the 
"footprint" that a Patriot unit can defend against 
ballistic missiles of all types, and has considerably 
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increased the system's lethality and effectiveness against 
ballistic missiles. It has also increased the scope of 
ballistic missiles that Patriot can engage, which now 
includes several intermediate range and continental 
ballistic missiles such as the No-Dong and the CSS-2 and 
CSS-3. However, despite its increases in ballistic missile 
defense capabilities, the PAC-3 missile is a less capable 
interceptor of atmospheric aircraft and air to surface 
missiles. In addition, it is slower, has a shorter range, 
and has a smaller warhead compared to older Patriot 
missiles. The Patriot's PAC-3 interceptor will be the 
primary interceptor for the new Medium-altitude, Extended 
Area Defense System (MEADS), which is scheduled to enter 
service alongside Patriot in 2012. 
Patriot upgrades continue, with the most recent being 
new software known as PDB-6 (PDB standing for "Post 
Deployment Build"). This software will allow configuration 
3 units to discriminate targets of all types, to include 
anti radiation missile carriers, helicopters, unmanned 
aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles. The software also 
contains new search algorithms designed to counter the 
growing cruise missile threat. The PAC-3 missile is 
currently undergoing testing for a significant new upgrade, 
currently referred to as "MSE" or "Missile Section 
Upgrade". The upgrade is similar to the GEM+T/C upgrade, in 
that it consists of a body redesign and subsequent 
replacement of the PAC-3 interceptor. The upgrade includes 
a new fin design and a new, more powerful rocket motor. The 
modification is alleged to increase the operational 
capability of the current PAC-3 missile up to 50% and is 
scheduled to be added to all existing PAC-3 missile stores 
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by 2008. Further upgrades to the dual-TWT radar set, the 
JTIDS uplink, and the system's processors and memory are 
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V. OBJECT-ORIENTED DESIGN FOR A WEAPON ASSIGNMENT 
WEAPON MODULE  
A. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE AND OBJECT-ORIENTED DESIGN 
Software architecture is receiving increasing 
attention as a critical design level for software systems. 
However, the current practice of architectural description 
is largely informal and ad hoc, with the consequence that 
architectural documents serve as a poor communication 
mechanism, are difficult to analyze, and may have very 
little relationship to the implemented system. Looking at 
the weapon assignment processing component diagram in 
Chapter II (see figure 1), further requirements for the 
system components have to be elaborated upon.  
The object-oriented paradigm offers a new system-of-
systems requirements and design methodology that provides 
for both minimizing accidental complexity and controlling 
essential complexity through the use of decentralized 
control flow, minimal messaging between classes, implicit 
case analysis, and information-hiding mechanisms. Although 
the ABM missile defense system will not be a pure object-
oriented design, we can incorporate many of the principles 
of object-oriented design to decrease the complexity of the 
overall work of art produced during the development of the 
system of systems. Research suggests that software 
engineers of system-of-systems can use this object-oriented 
paradigm to produce a sound design for the system-of-
systems rather than the established association of systems 
through a highly coupled communication medium.  
The purpose of the ABM weapon assignment module is to 
take input from the threat track processing and provide a 
62 
precise integration of the weapon assignment module for 
requirements. By developing a class diagram with abstract 
classes for the major components of the weapon assignment 
module of the ABM BMDS, one can reason about the design in 
our attempt to develop subclasses to which researchers can 
begin to allocate requirements and analyze system 
capabilities and limitations.  
B. UML MODELS FOR A WEAPON ASSIGNMENT MODULE DESIGN 
 The development of a class diagram enhances 
understanding for the operators and users of the system. 
The overall concepts can be drawn from the diagrams and 
addresses the goals of the weapon assignment components 
within the ABM BMDS system. The design class model aids in 
producing a coherent description of data store operation 
which attends to a well formulated interaction and 
interface between system components.  
Figure 3 is a high level conceptual model to capture 
the necessary elements of a weapons pairing component. This 
aids in the current plan being simultaneously developed, 
evaluated, refined, and validated, with each iteration 
providing a higher confidence in an overall effective BMDS.   
Without getting into the specifics of how the task 
should be done, this model focuses on what needs to be 
done, leaving detail design of individual agents for 
further work.  It is important that this intermediate step 
be taken in between a high level view of the entire system 





















Figure 3: Weapon Pairing Component Model 
 
Combatant Commanders (COCOM) conceptually are the 
ultimate customers of the entire system; therefore COCOM 
module represents the tasking to pair weapons.    
The BMDS weapon assignment manager component is where 
the algorithm that actually computes the best weapon for a 
given target resides.  This can be based on probability of 
kill or a number of other factors and should be designed in 
such a way that the algorithm is generic and can be 
replaced with a new one or modified, as necessary. 
In order to complete the computation, the weapons 
assignment manager component, given a threat track, 
consults the rules of engagement component to ensure that 
there are no conflicts with the given policy.  This may 
include whether to attack a threat missile over a friendly 














































point, etc.  In this depiction, the ROE component also 
includes the firing policy, though it could be represented 
as a separate function.  
The weapons system data store contains information 
about the weapons that are available and their overall 
characteristics.  Not only does this include logistical 
information about their individual inventory and location, 
but it includes capabilities such as max range, accuracy, 
etc.  This is because hard wiring decisions for which 
weapons to use for a given threat in the weapon assignment 
manager component would require a change of the algorithm 
each time a new system is introduced and oversimplifies the 
problem.  This view allows the capabilities to be polled, 
basing the decision on which interceptor to use purely on 
probability of kill analysis, not on platform type.  
The defended assets list is the source of information 
used to prioritize the threats.  Conceptually, this could 
be attached to the threat missiles component, feeding the 
weapon assignment manager component a pre-prioritized list 
of threats and relieving some of the computational burden 
on the primary module.  This may seem like a way to 
streamline the process, but such an approach may actually 
be more complex.   As new threats are introduced, 
priorities are rearranged respectively which possibly could 
cause the entire list to be reprioritized and may need to 
be re-sent, increasing the interaction between the modules. 
The following sections expand on what type of 
information must be considered for each component of the 




1. Threat Missiles    
The Threat Missile Class is the enemy missile that 
contains warhead of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical, or 
high explosive munitions. An adversary can launch a threat 
missile from their area or state. The missile can climb 
into the exo-atmospheric region of its flight. In addition, 
the missile may re-enter the atmosphere over our forces or 
defended assets at which time it may impact at its aim 
point. (Caffall2) Information regarding the identification, 
evaluation, and prioritization of threat objects are 
contained inside which are drawn from the track 
prioritization computation. Figure 4 captures the classes 
of the Threat Missile.  
 
Figure 4: Threat Missile Class Diagram 
 
The threat can be evaluated by determining what 
objects are candidates for engagement or defensive action. 
Next, the data received can determine whether engagements 
or actions are allowed, and assigns relative priorities to 
those objects designated as threats. Threat evaluation 
depends directly on track characterization processes which 
determine track category, type, identification and track 
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kinematics. Threat evaluation comprises doctrinal 
procedures that are based on prevailing rules of engagement 
or defensive action. Threat evaluation may be separated 
into the processes for threat assessment and threat 
prioritization. Threat assessment includes determining what 
objects are threats and whether engagements or defensive 
actions are allowed. Threat prioritization assigns relative 
priorities to the threats. In addition, when a threat is 
processed and another target emerges, a weapon previously 
directed and intended for a lower priority target could be 
redirected to the emergent target. 
2. Defended Assets List  
Potential enemies targets critical nodes that are high 
priority and links within the defended network. Defended 
Assets List contains the location and status of all 
defended assets (ground, maritime, and aerospace). It 
includes all defended objects and zones as well as points 
or areas on the ground within an area of interest. The 
assets are identified in the Joint Forces Command (JFC) 
approved defended asset list (DAL). The DAL is a 
prioritized listing of assets by phase and is included in 
the OPLAN and air defense plan.  Prioritization for the 
defended assets is based on established doctrine and/or 
operator input. The purpose of keeping track of all 
defended assets in the air or on the surface is to feed 
into the process of prioritizing threats and determining 
the best course of action (including determination of best 
shooter and/or intercept location) based on the defense of 
forces, Allies, and friendly civilian areas.  
In so doing, this ultimately supports the optimized 
use of warfighting resources. The defended assets 
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information can be displayed to operators and commanders in 
order to allow them to easily change prioritizations as 
necessary and take defensive action. Units are designated 
to protect critical assets or areas of the theater, fleet 
operating areas, and the battlefield. 
3. Rules of Engagement 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) must be delineated, 
published, and disseminated to, and exercised by, alliance 
or coalition members for compliance and as a planning 
consideration for future operations. Policy looks upon 
defining Rules of Engagement as directives issued by 
competent military authority that delineate the 
circumstances and limitations under which United States 
forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with 
other forces encountered. Rules of engagement can contain 
high and low conditions which has the same level of 
specificity, or non-specificity, respectively, as included 
in the commander’s intent. There can be no ambiguity, 
unnecessary detail and fuzziness in the set of ROE which 
might lead to a delay in responses due to hesitation, 
confusion, and additional communications needed to clarify 
the situation.  
In addition, ROE should enhance clarity for prediction 
to reduce “waste” of scarce assets and allow greater speed 
of response to time critical targets. Appropriate ROE must 
be established to deal with the potential threats. In 
addition, an effective combat firing doctrine is important 
so as to not overuse missile assets in combat. Rules of 
engagement must include hostile criteria, guidance 
documents, and the enemy order of battle. A confirmed 
launch triggers reaction by a preplanned selection of 
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appropriate defensive systems, according to established 
ROE. Short missile flight times require that all applicable 
air-, land-, sea-, and space-based sensor and surveillance 
assets be linked to provide a complete and current air 
picture. This will be accomplished through the use of shot 
doctrines, firing triggers and probability of kill. It is 
important to automate the enforcement of the ROE in 
Ballistic Missile Defense systems due to the strict time 
budgets for executing the battle plans.   
4. Weapon  
The Weapon class contains attributes for developing 
firing solutions, calculates the probability of kill, and 
implements the BM/C2 authorization to engage the threat 
missile by firing interceptors.  The weapon class issues 
release commands to the interceptor and its associated 
class. Figure 5 captures the classes of the weapon and 
their association for interface with various systems. 
 
Figure 5: Weapon Class Diagram 
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The weapon class can be specialized into four major 
subclasses, represented by the land based, sea based, air 
based, and space based anti-ballistic missile defense 
weapon system.  
In addition, each weapon has a health and status 
component and an interceptor component. The health and 
status information is updated continuously for each weapon 
to include readiness of weapon system, number of 
interceptors that are available, and current engagements of 
the weapon system. Health information is provided in 
regards to a resource’s ability to perform optimally. (For 
example, the health data of a weapon’s sensor may include 
its current registration, alignment, and calibration 
information as well as information regarding whether its 
operation is degraded.) Status information provides update 
information regarding a resource’s current tasking and 
thus, availability for future tasking. A resource may be 
on, off, or in standby. Each weapon contains a set of 
static information which includes the weapon’s capabilities 
(functional and performance) and limitations based on 
various environments, configurations, and threats or tasks. 
The interceptor component allows the flexibility of 
capturing the different capabilities with different weapon 
configurations. 
6. Weapon Assignment 
Weapon assignment contains the tasking order of weapon 
target pairing. It contains information on target 
identifications, earliest and latest time to commence 
engagement, launch or shoot time, and intercept depiction 
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which entails figure of merits, defended areas, and current 
engagement.  
7. The BMDS Weapon Assignment Manager 
The ABM system must determine the best choice of 
weapon for the threat and choose from among the assets the 
available weapon platform that can optimize the overall 
effectiveness of global ballistic missile defense. This 
module is further broken down into three submodules, Threat 
Evaluations, Weapon Pairing, and Engagement Scheduling. The 
Threat Evaluation module computes the value of potential 
defended assets damage for each threat. The weapons pairing 
module assign weapons to each threat to maximize the 
overall survival value of all the defended assets. The 
Engagement Scheduling module computes the time and location 
of the intercept subject to ROE constraints.  
All weapon systems and all threats may have different 
characteristics. For instance, different weapon systems may 
require a different amount of time to engage a threat; 
different threats may be moving at different speeds and at 
different distances. Also, a threat may suddenly change its 
course. A given weapon’s platform’s projectile has a known 
probability of hitting any particular target. The value of 
each target is known.  
Within the assumptions, a generic algorithm could be 
develop using the following factors: number of weapon 
platforms, number of targets, initial value of the targets, 
number of available projectile on each weapon platform, the 
maximum probability of hitting target over time with a 
projectile sent from weapon platform, and the number of 
projectile sent from weapon platform and aimed at target. 
More over, the algorithm must account for ROE policies that 
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may withhold certain weapon against a missile that is not a 
threat to the assets that the weapon is assigned to defend 
even though such weapon target pairing will maximize the 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF THESIS 
The global WMD/missile threat to US and allied 
territory, interests, forces, and facilities will increase 
significantly. Russia, China, and North Korea remain the 
‘WMD and missile’ suppliers of primary concern. Russia, for 
instance, has exported ballistic missile and nuclear 
technology to Iran. China has provided missile and other 
assistance to Iran and Pakistan. North Korea remains a key 
source for ballistic missiles, related components and 
materials. Over time, as other nations such as Iran acquire 
more advanced capabilities, they too are likely to become 
important proliferators. Several states of concern in 
particularly Iran and Iraq could acquire nuclear weapons 
during the next decade or so, and some existing nuclear 
states such as India and Pakistan, for instance, will 
undoubtedly increase their inventories. Chemical and 
biological weapons are generally easier to develop, hide, 
and deploy than nuclear weapons and will be readily 
available to those with the will and resources to attain 
them. More than two dozen states or non-state groups either 
have, or have an interest in acquiring, chemical weapons, 
and there are a dozen countries believed to have biological 
warfare programs. There should be an expectation that 
chemical and biological weapons will be widely proliferated 
and they could well be used in a regional conflict or 
terrorist attack over the next 15 years. 
The potential development/acquisition of 
intercontinental missiles by several states of concern, 
especially North Korea, Iran, and Iraq could fundamentally 
74 
alter the strategic threat. Meanwhile, longer-range theater 
(up to 3,000 km) ballistic and cruise missile technology 
proliferation is a growing challenge. The numbers of these 
systems will increase significantly during the next 15 
years in addition to their accuracy and destructive impact.  
Chapter I provided an overview of the research 
conducted on the history and background leading up to a 
weapon target assignment and purpose of study. Inside 
Chapter II, an analysis of the Advanced Battle Manager 
weapon assignment system was depicted with an overall 
overview of the current proposed weapon assignment 
processing components. A brief narrative providing 
information on four of the basic systems of TMD were 
explored within the constraints of the thesis. Chapter III 
involved looking at the Aegis system and its concept of 
operation focusing on advantages and disadvantages of sea 
based operation. The Aegis attributes were expounded upon 
as well as its future role in a Global Ballistic Missile 
Defense. This thesis provided ample information determining 
that sea-based defense is a mission enhancer. Naval forces 
will generally be the first units to arrive in a crisis 
area. Their inherent mobility and flexibility combined with 
a multi-mission Aegis capability will provide extensive 
coverage to support air, land and sea operations. Sea-based 
forces are unobtrusive, are not restricted by foreign 
basing rights, can remain on station indefinitely, and are 
not dependent on strategic lift. To achieve the defense-in-
depth and the extensive defended footprint necessary to 
support the Joint TMD framework requires the synergistic 
effect of sea-based and ground-based TBMD forces.  
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Chapter IV provided information of the Patriot missile 
defense system and background overview. The various 
attributes were provided along with the different 
configuration changes of the PAC-3. In addition, the 
success of the system and its current role in a Global 
Ballistic Missile Defense was provided. Chapter V displayed 
a high-level object-oriented design of a weapon assignment 
weapon module. The chapter explained the model and design 
with multiple diagrams for more detailed view of class 
components.  
In regards to the role of automated military weapon 
decision support systems, former undersecretary of defense 
for research and engineering and engineering professor, 
William J. Perry, known as the father of stealth 
technology, argued that humans, not machines, should make 
the final decision when striking targets and states, "I 
hope we are wise enough to use automation appropriately, 
which means keeping well-trained, thoughtful humans in the 
loop". (CUMMINGS) 
The land attack cruise missile (LACM) threat against 
North America is a topic of considerable debate and little 
consensus. However, regardless of perceptions of the 
immediate threat, a number of facts still exist that causes 
concern. The effectiveness of such missiles, as 
demonstrated by the U.S. in its last several wars, has not 
been lost on potential adversaries, and proliferation 
continues. More than 70 countries have cruise missiles, 
with an estimated total inventory exceeding 80,000 
worldwide. Since no worldwide tracking system seems to 
exist, there is no certainty as to how many of these 
missiles have been produced or converted to land attack 
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capability. But experts postulate as many as 20 countries 
could possess them in the next 10 years.  
For decades, the U.S. was engaged in a Cold War with 
the Soviet Union, and the air defense architecture built 
for the country was optimized for a large-scale-war 
scenario. Ground-based radars were built around the 
continent, and still serve as the basis for our air defense 
system. These radars are limited in range to line-of-sight 
to the horizon and optimized for larger radar cross-section 
targets at high altitude that is intruding aircraft. They 
cannot detect a cruise missile 100 m above the ground until 
it is too late.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this thesis, research has been presented in an 
informal way of addressing analysis of an ABM weapon 
assignment module that is essential ingredients for a 
general ABM system. There is a need to incorporate 
vulnerability and reliability inside the analysis which 
will dictate the success of the distributed architecture. 
Although our ability to predict the future is limited, as 
the U.S. continues to demonstrate its dominance on the 
conventional battlefield, there exist assumptions where 
future adversaries will learn and adapt their strengths to 
attack our perceived weaknesses. They will look for new 
ways to attack our interests, our forces, and our friends 
and allies. Asymmetric methods to counter U.S. superiority, 
including WMD and the means to deliver them may be 
perceived as viable means to affect U.S. power projection 
and coalition-building capabilities. This research 
contributed to highlighting some shortfalls in efforts to 
integrate capabilities and desired capabilities as the 
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missile threat evolves. Once highlighted, DOD could then 
address these integration shortfalls individually or 
collectively and thereby have the ability to significantly 
increase the ABM readiness. 
 1. ADVANCED RESEARCH IN ENGAGEMENT SURVEILLANCE 
Surveillance systems are ground-based with severely 
limited detection range against low-altitude targets. 
Intercept and engagement capabilities have to be 
continuously improved upon as new information and 
intelligence reports come available.  
 2. TESTING CONSIDERATION FOR ALLOCATING ASSETS 
Since initial research has addressed allocating 
assets, there is a need for more automation in regards to 
tool support for testing and developing for greater 
accuracy and concrete results for use with the system.  
 3. FURTHER STUDY FOR ADVANCED DESIGN WEAPON SYSTEMS 
The analysis presented here needs further development 
to determine not only their feasibility but their 
usefulness to the Battle Managers. Further research needs 
to be done to determine whether the system can accurately 
perform under the time constraints required for weapon 
pairing.  
 4. IMPLEMENT FUTURE ALGORITHMIC METHODS  
Developers must continually search for innovative ways 
to improve interchangeable algorithm for optimization. A 
feasible solution must always be reached in order for a 
high probability of success for weapon assignment and 
resource allocation to minimize complexity and constraints.   
 5. IMPROVISE TESTING, MODELING, AND ENGAGEMENT 
STRATEGIES   
More realistic modeling, testing, and evaluation would 
be required to demonstrate the effectiveness and 
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reliability under all engagement conditions for 
encountering and interception of a given threat. Allocating 
defensive resources to maximize the probability of survival 
requires further comparative evaluation for the ABM. The 
ABM weapon assignment components will have to manage the 
use of the integrated resources to ensure all time critical 
events are processed efficiently. Much of the work that has 
been accomplished within the forces of TBMD area is either 
classified or the level of detail is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  
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